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Theoretical Background 
 
In this study, I examine the effects of information on party voting in judicial elections.  In 
any low-profile race—that is, lower-ballot offices which do not garner much media coverage or 
other publicity—voters face the challenge of finding enough information to make an educated 
decision in the voting booth.  Yet in Ohio Supreme Court judicial races, the informational 
challenge is compounded by the fact that although candidates are nominated by political parties, 
their partisan identifications are not listed on the ballot.  In this climate, increased media 
coverage or campaign spending could exert significant influence on how much voters tend to 
vote on a party-line basis (that is, for the candidate from their own party).   A related issue is the 
effect of voters’ own education and political knowledge on party-line voting in contests for the 
Ohio Supreme Court.  In this thesis I examine both issues by analyzing survey data over a time 
period of twenty years.  There has been much scholarly concern over the past several years over 
the role of increased spending in judicial elections, as well as ongoing disagreements on the most 
appropriate method for selecting judges; this study will attempt to add new material for 
consideration on these important issues.  
  
Information and the vote in low-information contests 
Relative to other elections, elections to judgeships—judicial elections— do not generally 
attract much attention, from voters, the media, or even researchers.  This is true of other low-
information races, and in fact, many statewide offices below gubernatorial elections occur in a 
relative void of attention.  Because of this, there is a general lack of information about candidates 
and relevant issues, making it hard for voters to become informed.  Beyond this general dearth of 
information, part of the trouble is that aside from party labels, information on judicial candidates 
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can be hard to come by.  Adding to the problem are the formal and informal restrictions on what 
candidates are free to say about their ideological positions, a subject which will be addressed in 
more depth later on. 
  Although judicial elections might differ in some regards from races for other elected 
offices, researchers have found that voting behavior in judicial elections does not differ 
significantly from behavior in other low-information races.  In a study of voter turnout in judicial 
elections, Dubois found that “the level of participation in state supreme court elections is not 
universally low…it varies significantly among the states, and in fact is very much a function of 
the same factors which scholars have observed affect turnout in other kinds of elections” 
(Dubois, 1979b, 885).  Chris Bonneau (2007) came to similar conclusions in his article “The 
Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections,” and the general consensus 
seems to be that when provided with adequate information, voters make decisions rationally in 
judicial races, just as they would in other elections. 
 
Judicial selection systems: impact on voting and normative considerations 
Since participation levels tend to be low and since there is an apparent lack of relevant 
political knowledge held by those who vote in judicial races, some researchers, lawyers, and 
politicians have concluded that judges should not be subject to elections at all.  This conclusion 
might seem reasonable enough: one study of voters in Oregon and Washington found that only 
20% of respondents said that they had enough information to vote in statewide judicial races 
(Sheldon and Lovrich, 1983, 237).  Perhaps as a result of this, many states have chosen to forgo 
popular elections in favor of a merit retention plan (also called the Missouri Plan) in which 
judicial nominees are determined by a panel of lawyers and laypersons.  The panel then sends a 
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list of recommendations to the governor, who makes a selection from the list.  In such a system, 
the appointed judge is then subject to a retention vote, in which voters have a chance to decide 
whether the judge ought to stay in office—but at no point is the incumbent judge subject to a 
contested election.  Around twenty states now use merit selection for their state supreme courts, 
and some use it for other judgeships as well.  The rest continue to hold either partisan or 
nonpartisan elections for judges, or else use gubernatorial appointment or election by the state 
legislature (American Judicature Society, 2004).  While merit plans appeared to be on the rise up 
until about twenty years ago, in recent years there has not been much change in states’ selection 
systems.   
Despite the long-term decline in judicial elections, there remains popular support for 
selecting judges through elections. For instance, some surveys have confirmed that a majority of 
voters approve of the principle of elective judicial selection (Dubois, 1979b, 759).  Moreover, the 
study in Washington and Oregon reported that “at least two out of three of all those who 
responded to the survey indicated that judicial elections were as important or more important 
than other elections in the state” (Sheldon and Lovrich, 1983, 241-2).  In Ohio particularly, 
proposed merit retention plans have met with unfavorable results: a 1987 ballot measure to 
replace judicial elections with a merit retention plan was defeated 2-1 by voters (Felice and 
Kilwein, 1992).  During that election season, the merit plan (known as Issue 3) was supported 
mainly by the Ohio Bar Association and the Ohio League of Women Voters (OLWV).  The 
OLWV has long supported appointment of judges, contending that “a judge who is appointed to 
the bench is more likely to remain insulated from shifting popular will than is one who must face 
a competitive electoral gauntlet” (Felice and Kilwein, 1992, 195).  Many proponents of the 
Missouri Plan echo this sentiment, believing that such a system is the best way to insure that 
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judges “be as impartial and insulated from political pressures as possible” (Ibid).  Yet in Ohio, 
the opponents of Issue 3 were able to prevail by portraying the measure as an affront to voting 
rights.  
Even if judicial elections were widely accepted as an appropriate way to choose state 
judges, a debate would remain over what type of election system is best.  In terms of whether 
partisan or nonpartisan judicial elections are more effective, no single answer seems clear.  In 
recent literature, there is a trend for election scholars to treat party labels as a positive cue rather 
than a negative one.  Party clearly has “a unique relevance in voters’ eyes,” as a study by Klein 
and Baum (2001, 725) suggests, but is that for the better or the worse?  In “Teams without 
Uniforms,” the article’s authors maintain that party labels “convey generally accurate policy 
information about candidates” and that “their low cost and accessibility help voters to reach 
reasonable decisions” (Schaffner, Wright, and Streb, 2002, 9).  The article goes on to point out 
that in nonpartisan elections, voters are not given any added incentives to bear the increased 
informational costs of seeking out information on the candidates’ party affiliations (10).   
Numerous studies have shown that participation is lower in nonpartisan races (e.g., see 
Schaffner, Dubois), but again, there is no consensus on whether that is actually a negative 
quality.  In a nonpartisan, low-information election, more than in a partisan, high-visibility race, 
Baum posits that it is “the most knowledgeable voters” who “are likely to determine the impact 
of campaigns and the outcomes of elections” (Baum, 1987, 71).  Perhaps a more knowledgeable 
electorate benefits the democratic process; encouraging elections to be determined by those who 
actively seek out information could then be considered desirable.  On the other hand, the authors 
of the study on Washington and Oregon voters concluded that “the attentive judicial voter is 
trying to hold up his or her part of the accountability requirement.  However, the candidates […] 
6 
 
have failed to make a meaningful effort toward giving the voter more of what he or she wants in 
the way of information” (Sheldon and Lovrich, 1983, 245).  According to this view, partisan 
elections would benefit voters by providing more obvious and accessible information. 
 
Changes in the nature of judicial contests 
 In recent years, judicial elections have been subject to increasingly high campaign costs, 
prompting criticism about whether such spending is appropriate for candidates for judgeships.  
Judicial contests during the past several election cycles have often cost several million dollars 
each.  Although there had been expensive races previously—the Ohio Chief Justice race in 1986 
is a prime example—the recent rise in spending has been sharp and quick.  For instance, 
“between 2000 and 2002, average candidate spending in state supreme court races increased 167 
percent.  From 2002 to 2004, spending increased an additional 168 percent on average” 
(Caufield, 2007, 37).  This trend has widely been regarded as a negative development, associated 
with the simultaneous trend towards greater interest group involvement and a general move away 
from the “low-profile, quiet, or dignified affairs” of the past (Ibid).  The influx of money has led 
to concerns that judicial candidates might be more easily swayed by special interest groups.  In 
its 1987 campaign against selection of judges by popular election, the Ohio League of Women 
Voters “argued that the Ohio justice system can, in essence, be sold to the highest bidder as the 
prospective judge searches for more funds to run expensive campaigns” (Felice and Kilwein, 
1992, 195). 
 On the other hand, costlier elections might actually benefit voters in choosing candidates.  
If candidates and outside interest groups spend more on campaigns, presumably voters will be 
exposed to more information on candidates and relevant issues.  Some research has shown that a 
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high-visibility judicial election results in a significantly higher turnout rate than a more typical 
low-visibility one (Baum and Klein, 2007).  From this angle, the ramping up of spending in 
judicial elections ought not to be seen in a wholly negative light. 
 
Information and rolloff rates 
Naturally, the relative obscurity in which judicial elections generally take place has an 
effect on voters’ participation in these races.  The rolloff rates—the percentage of people voting 
for some issues or offices but not for others on the same ballot— are often quite high between 
those voting in more prominent elections, such as congressperson or governor, and those voting 
for state judges. That is, the number of people who go to the polls and cast a vote for more 
prominent offices is much greater than those who cast a vote in judicial races.  A significant 
minority of voters make the effort to show up to the polls but do not vote in all races.  
Inquiries into why rolloff occurs have found that it is not the result of voter fatigue, but 
rather of insufficient information on the part of the voters: as on standardized tests, voters tend to 
fill out answers only to the questions about which they know something (Wattenberg, 2000, 
236).  Supporting this view are the findings that lack of political knowledge correlates better with 
rolloff than lack of education, and that rolloff voters tend to be less interested in politics in 
general.  Moreover, one study found that a majority of rolloff voters reported having zero 
exposure to either candidate, indicating that more effective campaigns could benefit by targeting 
likely rolloff voters (Ibid, 245). 
Studies on the varying types of judicial elections have shown that nonpartisan judicial 
elections tend to have much higher roll-off rates than partisan races in demographically similar 
states (or in some cases, the same state at different times, before and after a change in selection 
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system).  This suggests that many voters, faced with an election about which they know little or 
nothing, will choose not to participate if party cues are not provided.  One study found that 
voters were much more likely to hold an opinion on an election if partisan information was 
provided: the addition of such information “turns a previously unstructured response into one 
which is dominated by a respondent’s party identification” (Squire and Smith, 1988, 170).  As 
the authors expected, voters with higher levels of information were more likely to hold opinions 
about the elections.  Unexpectedly, though, the addition of partisan information almost removed 
that relationship entirely, leveling the playing field between better- and less- informed voters.  If 
this example holds true in general, it would seem that partisan judicial elections are perhaps more 
democratic, because they encourage people of varying knowledge levels to vote more than 
nonpartisan elections do. 
 
Information and determinants of the vote 
Clearly, voters in judicial elections lack meaningful information on which to base their 
decisions.  In part, this is no accident: up until a few years ago, rules by The American Bar 
Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly placed severe limits on candidates’ ability to 
discuss issues which might come before them as sitting judges.  Those rules then became 
effective by being incorporated into states’ own rules governing judicial elections.  The 2002 
Supreme Court decision Republican Party v. White struck down many campaign speech 
restrictions, “forcing virtually all states to abandon their existing codes of judicial conduct” 
(Caufield, 2007, 39).  In summarizing the case’s implications, Rachel P. Caufield writes that the 
decision “allowed candidates to openly provide high-information cues to voters—including 
ideological positions, party affiliation […] and stances on controversial issues” (Caufield, 2007, 
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39).  In her study of the case’s impact, Caufield found that in states which have interpreted the 
Court’s decision broadly, there has been some change in how judicial candidates promote their 
own views and attack their opponents.  However, since the White decision was made only five 
years ago, long-term effects of the case are yet to be seen.  It seems that the decision has the 
potential to further politicize judicial campaigns, but perhaps it will also lead to voters having 
easier access to relevant information on judicial candidates and races. 
Beyond the formal rules which limit speech, Philip Dubois has pointed out that there are 
informal norms of behavior which dictate that candidates not engage in “the substantive 
discussion of legal philosophies, judicial decisions, and public policy issues” (Dubois, 1979b, 
759).  This in turn limits campaign debate to issues like the candidates’ formal qualifications and 
methods of judicial administration, which may not be of particular interest to voters (Ibid, 760).  
Along with the shift in formal rules, however, informal norms may be shifting in a more 
permissive direction as well.  At the same time, Dubois does not see the low levels of voter 
awareness as atypical.   He found that voter knowledge on judicial candidates’ qualifications is 
roughly equivalent to their awareness of candidates for other low-information offices (races for 
positions in which voters typically would not have much information or interest, as compared to 
high-information races like those for president, congressperson, or governor).   
Because judicial elections are often such low information affairs, the amount of media 
attention garnered by a race or the amount of money raised—and thus the amount of 
advertising— by a particular candidate could have a significant impact on the outcome.  One 
study suggests that “in such low information environments, even a modestly effective campaign 
might have substantial effects where voters have few readily available pointers on who they 
should support” (Shaffner, Wright, and Streb, 2001, 26).  Moreover, Baum has found that not 
10 
 
only does the amount of information matter, but so does the content.  In the 1984 Ohio Supreme 
Court races, media attention was more favorable to Republican candidates than Democrats, 
which may have influenced the decisions made by the more informed voters (Baum, 1987).   
Another study, by Baum and Klein, compared judicial elections in 1998, a typical low-
visibility year, and 2002, when media coverage and campaign spending were unusually high 
(Baum and Klein, 2007).  Unsurprisingly, turnout rates were significantly higher in the latter 
races.  Rolloff from the gubernatorial race was half as high in 2002 as in 1998, indicating that 
many voters who would otherwise have skipped the judicial elections, even after coming to the 
polls, chose to participate instead (Baum and Klein, 2007).  However, the study also found that 
voters’ partisan identifications had similar effects in both election years.  Furthermore, political 
knowledge levels remained low in 2002, even with the added attention given to the judicial 
races.  This lack of knowledge on the part of voters applied even to basic facts about the 
candidates: for instance, only one in five respondents were able to correctly identify one 
candidate as more liberal than her opponent.  As the report concludes, the “lack of knowledge 
underlines the limits in what the 2002 campaigns communicated to voters.”  Thus, the campaigns 
“could convey to the voters that the supreme court contests were important.  They were not so 
successful in conveying why the contests were important” (p 164).  This result indicates that the 
amount of information available in a given election may not actually have much impact on how 
knowledgeable voters will be or how much party-line voting will occur. 
Also inconclusive is the effect that campaign spending has on judicial elections.  
Bonneau found that spending by challengers increased the likelihood of incumbent defeat, 
thereby enhancing electoral competition and leading to more electoral accountability.  
Conversely, he found that greater spending by incumbents had no effect on the margins of 
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victory.  By this logic, more stringent campaign finance regulations would serve to strengthen 
the (already significant) incumbency advantage and decrease the competitiveness of judicial 
elections (Bonneau, 2007).  In another study, however, Bonneau found that in cases where the 
incumbent was appointed to his or her position, the key element to the election result was the 
spending ratio between incumbent and challenger (Bonneau, 2005).  The narrower the ratio was, 
the higher the chance that the incumbent would lose.  Typically, incumbents have more resources 
at their disposal than challengers, and are thus able to spend more on their campaigns.  In races 
in which a challenger faces an appointed incumbent, it would seem that limiting the maximum 
amount of campaign spending might have the opposite effect of the one described above.  By 
putting a cap on spending, it is more likely that the challenger could match the amount spent by 
the incumbent (Bonneau, 2005, 834).  But while spending clearly has some effect on electoral 
verdicts, the study by Baum and Klein reminds shows that money only has so much impact in 
low-information races, and may not actually exert much influence on how people decide who to 
vote for (Baum and Klein, 2007). 
As these various and sometimes conflicting studies have shown, the relationship between 
information and voting behavior is complex.  That relationship has been interpreted in different 
ways.  It has been posited, for instance, that “partisans…use their information to reinforce their 
partisanship” (Macaluso, 1977, 255).  According to this idea, those with strong party preferences 
will take into account new information that supports their existing views, while disregarding 
information that conflicts with what they already believe.  A different hypothesis supporting the 
same relationship is that more well-informed and politically knowledgeable voters tend to be 
those who hold stronger political beliefs, and who would thus be less likely to be independent or 
unidentified with a party.  On the other hand, one could argue that as voters gain more 
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information on candidates, they might discover complex reasons for voting one way or another, 
rather than merely using party identification as an easy cue.  In a typical partisan election, I 
would expect this to be the case, and I would thus expect that party voting would be highest 
among those with the lowest information levels.   
 
The Study 
 
Ohio judicial selection system 
As noted before, the great majority of states select their judges through merit retention 
systems, nonpartisan elections, or partisan elections. The Ohio judicial election system is notable 
for its hybrid mix of nonpartisan and partisan elements.  Candidates for the Ohio Supreme Court 
must first run in a partisan primary, but for the general election, parties are not listed on the 
ballot.  Still, since candidates are chosen by party, voters have different means of discovering the 
candidates’ party affiliations, including through name recognition, campaign appeals which 
emphasize party, and slates of candidates sent by the state party organization to registered voters 
(Baum, 1987, 64). Michigan has a similar system, though judicial nominees there are chosen at a 
party convention, not through a partisan primary.  The only other state to have adopted such a 
plan is Arizona, which gave it up in favor of a merit selection plan in 1974 (Dubois, 1979a, 761).  
Thus, Ohio presents a unique subject for research, since it combines elements of both types of 
elections. 
 
Scope of the project 
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Because party labels are not listed on the ballots in Ohio general elections for judgeships, 
a voter’s first step towards gaining more information about a judicial race would likely be to 
discern which candidate goes with which party.  The importance of the party label has been 
noted in various voting behavior research; as Dubois writes, “voters in low-salience elections 
rely upon available voting cues, and in partisan judicial elections the party label is the most 
meaningful guide to voting” (Dubois, 1979b, 768).  Some scholars find party labels to be a 
useful, accurate shortcut to information about candidates.   Others, however, believe that 
partisanship has no place in judicial selection, which should be free from the bias of party 
identification.  For researchers on either side, my study will provide a valuable example of how 
information affects the way voters make decisions. 
Some research in this field has centered on voting cues other than party labels which 
might influence the outcomes of low-information races, those elections which do not receive 
much media attention and which tend not to be well-funded by candidates or parties.  For 
instance, Monika McDermott studied the effects of gender on voting and discovered that female 
candidates performed better among liberals and worse among conservatives than males of the 
same party, indicating a prevailing stereotype that women are more liberal than men 
(McDermott, 1997).  While this research was not specific to judicial races, judicial elections are 
a prime example of low-information races, in which voters might use any available cues to guide 
their decision making process.    
Through my research, I will attempt to determine the relationship between the frequency 
of party-line voting in Ohio Supreme Court races and the information levels present in the races.  
I will examine both the amount of information about judicial elections and races that voters have 
access to and the level of education or (for the later election years) the amount of political 
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knowledge that voters possess.  The basic research question is: as voters acquire more 
information about a particular electoral race, will they be more or less likely to vote for the 
candidate from their own party?  There are two parallel issues here: the amount of political 
knowledge and education that a voter brings to an election booth, based on that voter’s own 
characteristics, and the amount of information that is actually available in any given election.     
In Ohio judicial elections, unlike purely partisan judicial elections, a key component to 
information gathering would be to determine the party affiliation of the candidates.   Therefore, 
the first distinguishing factor between less informed and more informed voters would be 
awareness of party.  In this atmosphere, some informational cues—particularly gender or name 
recognition—would actually be easier to obtain for voters than party, since such information can 
be obtained directly from the ballot.  Moreover, the overall amount of information available to 
voters is relatively scarce, so there might not be much to dissuade voters from making their 
decision based mainly on party affiliation, if they are aware of said affiliation.  In such an 
atmosphere, differences in campaign spending and media coverage have the potential to 
significantly impact voters’ likelihood to vote on a party basis.  Thus, given my background 
reading on the subject, and my instincts regarding the importance of party labels to voters, my 
first hypothesis is that as levels of available information increase, voters are more likely to vote 
on a party-line basis.  
The second issue I seek to examine is the role of voters’ education and political 
knowledge in determining party voting rates.  As education and/or political knowledge increase, 
does a voter’s likelihood to vote on a party-line basis increase as well?  So far, no conclusive 
evidence has been found in either direction, although Theodore Macaluso claims that there is no 
correlation between the strength of voters’ partisan identification and their level of political 
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knowledge (Macaluso, 1977).  That is, the category of better-informed voters did not coincide 
with those most likely to vote based on party.  According to that argument, education and 
information levels would have little effect on voters’ likelihood to vote based on party.   
However, in a race in which party labels are not provided on the ballot, more of a gap 
might exist between the more informed or better educated voters, who have determined party 
identification on their own, and the less informed or less educated voters, who have no such 
identification to guide them.  This assumes that education and knowledge correlate positively 
both with information seeking (voters’ likelihood to find and incorporate partisan information on 
candidates) and with party voting.  I expect that, since other relevant information would be hard 
to come by in a typical judicial race, increased information would correspond with increased 
party voting.  Just as I expect party voting to be higher when media coverage and spending are 
higher, I also hypothesize that voters with higher education and more political knowledge will be 
more likely to vote on a party-line basis.  Given this expectation, my third hypothesis is that I 
expect to see stronger correlations between the information variables and party voting rates for 
the former group than for the latter—that is, high information levels should have more of an 
impact on the voters with more knowledge and higher education levels. 
By comparing the levels of party-line voting with the amount of information available in 
different election years, and by comparing more informed voters with those who are less 
informed, I should be able to gather enough information to develop a strong idea of whether my 
hypotheses hold true.      
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Research design and methodology 
Since 1984, The Ohio State University Political Science department has conducted post-
election surveys which measure a number of variables about the respondents themselves as well 
as their voting behavior in the various statewide electoral races that took place each year.  To 
date, no study has been conducted comparing judicial voting behavior across such a time span; in 
this study I analyze the survey results from each gubernatorial election year between 1986 and 
2006.   The scope of this project is unique, since few surveys have been conducted which include 
questions about judicial elections, especially surveys conducted over such a lengthy time period.  
This is the first opportunity—not just in Ohio, but nationwide—to examine voting behavior in 
judicial elections over time based on survey data.                                                                                                                                                                                       
 Having discussed the theoretical issues relevant to my research, I will now summarize the 
research design I plan to use, starting with an explanation of the variables I will employ.  Voter 
knowledge will be measured by education levels and general political knowledge, as 
demonstrated by respondents’ answers to survey questions.  Party identification will be measured 
by self-identified party and ideological identifications.  Availability of information will be 
determined by the relative amount of money spent for each race and the amount of media 
coverage of the races.  For the campaign spending variable, I looked at Ohio Secretary of State 
records of spending by candidates in the pre- and post- general election periods.  For the media 
variable, I surveyed archives of The Columbus Dispatch and The Plain Dealer, Ohio’s largest-
circulation newspapers.  I examined the archives between September 1st of each election year, 
generally acknowledged to be the beginning of the general election season, and election day.  For 
each race, I tallied all the articles which mentioned either the election or the candidate in the 
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headline or the first paragraph, to compare how much media coverage there was of different 
races. 
The sample of elections, fourteen races between 1986 and 2006, provides good contrasts 
to test the research question of how information affects party voting behavior.  While there is a 
good deal of variation in terms of spending and media coverage, three races stand out as having 
had significantly more media attention and campaign spending than the rest.  These three—the 
chief justice race in 1986 and the two judicial elections in 2002—provide a chance to test the 
hypothesis that increased levels of available information will yield increased rates of party 
voting.  In the pages that follow, I will present the results of my research, and then I will 
conclude with an analysis of those results and implications for the field of research on judicial 
elections 
Results 
Table 1 
PERCENT PARTY VOTING IN JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL RACES 
 
Year Governor Secretary of State Chief Justice Associate Justice 1 Associate Justice 2  
1986 80.4 79.5 71.1 61.8 57.9 
1990 82.6 80.4   58.8 74.6 
1994 72.6 77   52.1 57.4 
1998 82.3 79.8 55.3 63.1 43.4 
2002 85.1 80.7   68 67 
2006 82.8 82.6   54.5 74.2 
            
Mean 81.0 80 63.2 61.1*  
            
Standard deviation 4.36 1.83 11.17 11.96*  
Note: Party voting is measured by the percentage of voters who select the candidate from their own party. 
*Mean and Standard deviation were averaged and combined for Associate Justice 1 and 2, since both 
represent equal positions on the court 
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 To begin analyzing the results, I first compared the rates of party voting in Supreme 
Court races to those in two sets of non-judicial races, for Governor and Secretary of State (Table 
1).  This comparison allowed me to look at the difference between races which list party on the 
ballot (as both the gubernatorial and Secretary of State elections do) and judicial elections, where 
party is not listed.  At the same time, the Secretary of State races, like judicial elections, tend to 
be low-information and low-visibility, whereas the more conspicuous gubernatorial races feature 
higher levels of available information.  Unsurprisingly, both the partisan offices featured 
substantially higher rates of party voting, with the average for the Governor’s races at 80.97% 
and the Secretary of State’s mean at 80%.  All three sets of judicial races—for Chief Justice and 
both Associate Justice positions—had means nearly twenty percent lower, ranging from 61.1% 
to 63.2%.  Perhaps less predictable is the result that there was more consistency, as displayed by 
lower standard deviation measures, in the non-judicial races, perhaps indicating that there is less 
variation between election years in the amount of information available on those races.  In terms 
of the candidates’ party affiliations, there would actually be no variation at all, and there might 
also be less variation in the availability of partisan information beyond party identification.  One 
other finding is that the highest level of party voting was found in the races for the high visibility 
office, the Governor elections.  This might be counterintuitive since in a race with more 
information, there might be more reasons to vote against party than to toe the party line, but it 
could be that voters display a bit more party loyalty when it comes to higher-ticket offices.  In 
any case, the difference between the gubernatorial mean and the Secretary of State mean was 
quite small. 
Next, in Table 2, I take a first look at the impact of media and campaign spending on 
party voting, comparing party voting levels to expenditures and newspaper coverage for each 
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election.  In this study, party voting is defined as self-identified Republicans voting for the 
Republican candidate and self-identified Democrats voting for the Democratic candidate—that 
is, party-consistent voting.  According to the survey results, voters were categorized along a 
seven-point continuum, including those who identified as strong Republicans, those who said 
they were weak Republicans, and those who at first stated that they were independent but then in 
a follow-up question said that they “leaned” Republican.  The same three categories are found on 
the Democratic side, and the remaining category is made up of independent voters who did not 
lean towards either party.  In the party voting measure, anyone who was not in this final, middle 
category was included, so those who leaned Republican or Democrat were grouped alongside the 
strong and weak partisans.   
While there is a wide range in the amount of money spent as well as in the number of 
articles published about each race, both variables can be easily grouped into the same two 
categories.  Of the fourteen races, three in particular featured especially high amounts of 
spending and higher levels of media coverage than the rest: the Chief Justice race between 
Celebrezze and Moyer in 1986, and both Associate Justice races in 2002, between Black and 
O’Connor and between Stratton and Burnside.  Since this is the case, I grouped the three 
relatively high-visibility races together and compared the levels of party voting in those races to 
the levels in the rest (Table 3). 
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Table 2 
PARTY VOTING VS. CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND MEDIA COVERAGE 
 
 
% Party 
Voting 
Campaign 
Spending 
Media 
coverage 
Contest    
1986    
Celebrezze/Moyer 71.1 2316153 56 
Sweeney/ Holmes 61.8 447573 16 
Brown/George 57.9 277957 15 
1990    
Banks/Douglas 58.8 328979 9 
Jones/Wright/Haffey 74.6 736115 8 
1994    
Cook/Haffey 52.1 424067 7 
Resnick/Harper 57.4 394740 8 
1998    
Tyack/Moyer 55.3 679059 13 
Sweeney/Powell 63.1 387868 12 
Suster/Pfeifer 43.4 485623 10 
2002    
Black/O'Connor 67.0 1617782 55 
Stratton/Burnside 68.0 1656533 67 
2006    
O'Neill/O'Donnell 54.5 440100 11 
Cupp/Espy 74.2 631066 7 
Note: Party voting: percentage of voters who select the candidate from their own party.  Media coverage: 
number of articles featuring the election/candidates in The Columbus Dispatch and The Plain Dealer 
during Sep-Nov of the election year. Campaign spending: amount of money spent by both candidates 
during the general election season, measured in 1986 dollars. 
 
Table 3 
PARTY VOTING IN HIGH-VISIBILITY VS. LOW-VISIBILITY JUDICIAL RACES 
 
 
Mean Party 
Voting 
Mean 
Spending 
Mean Media 
Coverage 
Top 3 68.7 1863489 59.3 
Other 11 59.4 475740 10.5 
Significance (2-tailed difference of means test): .009 
See note to Table 2. 
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 The results are striking, and correspond well with my hypothesis that greater levels of 
information would lead to higher levels of party voting.  Indeed, the mean percentage of voters 
choosing the candidate of their own party in the higher visibility races is 68.7%, whereas the 
same figure for the lower visibility races is 59.4%.  This suggests that the amount of information 
available about a given election does have the power to influence how voters make decisions, 
possibly by making it easier for voters to associate candidates with the correct party labels.   
 Next, I looked at the correlations between party voting and both media coverage and 
campaign expenditures, to see which variable has the greater impact.  For the correlation, I 
examined two measures of party voting: first, the percentage of partisans selecting the candidate 
from the party they prefer; and second, the relationship between a 5-point party identification 
scale and the vote.  The 5-point scale groups weak partisans and leaning voters together, so that 
the scale is made up of strong Democrats, weak and leaning Democrats, true independents, weak 
and leaning Republicans, and strong Republicans.   
Table 4 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INFORMATION AND PARTY VOTING 
(one-tailed significance levels in parentheses) 
 
 Spending Media Coverage 
Percent of voters choosing their party's candidate .525 (.027) .409 (.073) 
Relationship between party identification (5 point scale) and voting .440 (.058) .320 (.133) 
See note to Table 2 for explanations of spending and media coverage. 
 
 In both cases, spending appears to have a substantially greater impact than media.  In all 
four cases, the correlation is positive, as would be expected.  For the percent party vote variable, 
moreover, the correlation between vote and spending achieves the .05 level of significance.  This 
is impressive, given the relatively small number of contests being examined.  Since statistical 
significance is dependent on the number of cases in a sample, even a strong relationship in such a 
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small sample is unlikely to meet the criterion for significance.  For the other party vote variable, 
the correlation does not quite reach significance, but it is still much closer for spending than for 
media.  This finding indicates that voters are less influenced by newspaper coverage of judicial 
races and more by the advertisements bought with campaign money which might help associate 
the candidates with a given political party.  Running a regression on the same variables (Table 5) 
clarified what the correlation had suggested: spending has more influence than media.  Since the 
two independent variables are competing with each other to explain the same thing, the media 
numbers came up negative in the regression, showing that spending has more of an impact. 
Table 5 
REGRESSION OF SPENDING AND MEDIA COVERAGE VS. PARTY VOTING 
 
Dependent variable: party voting    
Independent variables B t Sig* 
Spending 10.898 1.881 0.087 
Media Coverage -3.339 -0.700 0.498 
Constant -74.903 -1.114 0.289 
 
Adjusted R squared: 
.179 
*Two-tailed significance measure 
 After analyzing the effects of different information levels on elections, I moved from the 
unit of the election to the unit of the voter to see if there were differences in party voting among 
distinct groups of voters.  Here I sought to test my second and third hypotheses, about the 
relationships between voters’ education and knowledge and party-line voting. In the course of 
the survey, respondents were asked about their highest completed levels of education; voters 
were then grouped into two categories, college graduates and non-college graduates.  The mean 
results of party voting across the fourteen contests for the two groups can be found in Table 6.  
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Table 6 
PARTY VOTE VS. EDUCATION 
 
  Mean % Party Vote 
College grad  62.8 
Non grad  60.7 
  
Interestingly, although voters with college educations had a slightly higher average rate 
of party voting, that difference was rather minimal, indicating that education might not play 
much role in how influenced voters were by party labels.  In addition to looking at the raw 
numbers of party voting, I also wanted to compare the impact of information levels on the two 
groups of voters. 
 
Table 7 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INFORMATION AND PARTY VOTING BASED ON 
EDUCATION 
(one-tailed significance levels in parentheses) 
 
 Spending Media Coverage 
College Graduates .540 (.023) .482 (.041) 
Non-College Graduates .348 (.111) .336 (.120) 
See note to Table 2 for explanations of spending and media coverage. 
 
Table 8 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INFORMATION AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PARTY ID AND VOTING BASED ON EDUCATION 
(one-tailed significance levels in parentheses) 
 
 Spending Media Coverage 
College Graduates .404 (.076) .278 (.168) 
Non-College Graduates .306 (.144) .220 (.225) 
See note to Table 2 for explanations of spending and media coverage. 
 
 As with the correlations for voters in the aggregate, here I looked at both measures of 
party voting, and similarly, the correlations were stronger for the percent party voting variable 
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than the variable measuring the relationship between the five-point party identification and the 
vote.  For both groups of voters, it appears that spending has a greater correlation with party 
voting than media coverage does.  Furthermore, the correlations were stronger for college 
graduates than non-graduates, indicating that information levels have the potential to make more 
of an impact on more educated voters than less educated ones.  However, that interpretation 
should be regarded cautiously, since only two relationships—the party vote of college graduates 
compared to media and spending, in Table 7—actually reach the level of significance. 
 Although the surveys in each election year included questions measuring the 
respondents’ education levels, only the most recent surveys, from 1998, 2002, and 2006, 
included questions to measure respondents’ political knowledge levels.  In those years, 
respondents were asked four or five questions testing their knowledge of contemporary politics 
(example: Which party held the majority of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives before the 
November election?).  Based on those results, voters were grouped into two categories (high 
knowledge and low knowledge) based on the number of items answered correctly, with the aim 
of having both groups roughly equal in size. Since this is a more direct measure than education 
of voters’ personal levels of information pertaining to an election, it is salient to include data on 
this variable, even though the sample size includes only half of the elections examined in this 
study. 
 Table 9 compares rates of party voting among the high knowledge voters with the rates 
for low knowledge voters.  Here, the difference between the two information groups is much 
more dramatic than in the education groups, with a mean percent party vote of 63.6% for high 
knowledge voters, over eight percentage points higher than the low knowledge voters, whose 
mean was 55.3%. 
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Table 9 
PARTY VOTE VS. KNOWLEDGE (1998—2006) 
 
 
Mean % Party 
Vote 
High 
knowledge  63.6 
Low 
knowledge  55.3 
Note: based on the four political knowledge questions, voters were divided into two roughly equal 
categories. 
 
 
This seems like a logical result: those voters who are more politically aware in general are more 
likely to be aware of which candidates belong to which political party.  Even more striking is the 
fact that when the two groups of voters are compared in terms of the effect that spending and 
media coverage have on them, the high knowledge voters are much more affected (Tables 10 and 
11).  Thus, when more information about a given election is available, that information has a 
higher impact on those voters who have more political knowledge than those who do not.  It is 
especially interesting that the relationship between spending and the percent of party voting is 
statistically significant for high knowledge voters.  Since there were only seven cases, this was 
an even smaller sample than that used in the analyses which encompassed all the judicial 
contests between 1986 and 2006.  Overall, then,  we can see that knowledge differences matter 
more in terms of groups of voters than educational differences do, indicating that political 
knowledge is a more meaningful predictor of what voters learn from campaigns. 
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Table 10 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INFORMATION AND PARTY VOTING BASED ON 
KNOWLEDGE 
(one-tailed significance levels in parentheses) 
 
 Spending Media Coverage 
Low Knowledge Voters -.069 (.441) -.030(.474) 
High Knowledge Voters .702(.039) .593 (.080) 
See note to Table 2 for explanation of spending and media coverage, and note to Table 9 for definition of 
high and low knowledge voters. 
 
Table 11 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INFORMATION AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PARTY ID AND VOTING BASED ON KNOWLEDGE 
(one-tailed significance levels in parentheses) 
 
 Spending Media Coverage 
Low Knowledge Voters .159 (.366) .189 (.343) 
High Knowledge Voters .488 (.133) .380 (.200) 
See note to Table 2 for explanation of spending and media coverage, and note to Table 9 for definition of 
high and low knowledge voters. 
 
 
 
Discussion of Results 
 As hypothesized, the amount of information available about a given election correlates 
positively with party voting, for both the spending and media variables.  That is, the more 
information that is available about a race, the more likely people will be to vote for the candidate 
of their own party.  To a lesser extent, my second hypothesis was also confirmed: the high-
education and high-knowledge respondents had higher party-line voting rates than the low-
education and low-knowledge groups, though the differences were not major.  It is important to 
emphasize again that the Ohio system of judicial elections is unique in its mix of partisan and 
nonpartisan elements: since parties are not listed on the ballot for judicial candidates, partisan 
identification might be one of the first pieces of information a voter would seek out.  Therefore, 
the results of this study should not be extrapolated into partisan elections, in which the party 
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identification of candidates would be known even to those voters who come into a voting booth 
with no outside information at all.  In that case, more information could perhaps have the 
opposite effect, offering voters reasons other than party to choose one candidate over another.  
By the same token, the effects of information would likely be different for purely nonpartisan 
elections as well, for which partisan identification cues are not available, not even through a high 
informational cost to voters.  Instead, voters without much knowledge about a given race might 
rely on other cheap cues, such as incumbency (often taking the form of name recognition) or 
gender.  Measuring informational effects would thus be more challenging for a nonpartisan race, 
since a variable other than party voting would have to be chosen to analyze how voters respond 
to high- or low- visibility races. 
 Of the two information variables examined in this study, spending was clearly more 
influential on voting behavior than media.  This may be due in part to the nature of the variables: 
the results of spending would be seen most obviously in television ads, while the media variable 
in this study included only newspaper coverage of elections.  Television has a wider audience 
than newspaper does, so it is possible that the results would be different if the media variable 
included TV news coverage of judicial races.  Another possibility has to do with the type of 
information being conveyed: perhaps ads paid for by candidates do a better job of associating 
candidates with parties than newspaper articles do.  This makes some intuitive sense, since the 
goal of an ad would be to provide useful information to voters which would help them decide to 
vote for a particular candidate, whereas newspaper articles seeking merely to cover election-
related issues would have no such aim.   
 Another interesting finding is that the knowledge variable seems to be more significant 
than the education variable in distinguishing groups of voters.  This is not surprising, since 
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political knowledge questions reveal more about a voter’s interest in and engagement with 
politics than the voter’s level of education.  The knowledge variable is a more direct 
measurement of what the education variable indirectly suggests.  Moreover, election scholars 
have previously found knowledge to be a more accurate measure than education (Carpini and 
Keeter, 1993). 
 Confirming my third hypothesis, the results show that information levels have more 
impact on high knowledge voters than low knowledge ones (and, to a less significant extent, 
more impact on high education than low education voters as well).  Why would information 
make more of a difference to those who already possess more awareness of politics?  It could be 
that high knowledge voters are more likely to seek out sources of information about elections in 
order to make informed decisions.  Those with political knowledge are likely to be interested in 
politics and thus pay more attention to the information that is available.  The positive correlation 
between party voting and information for high knowledge voters suggests that those who already 
have some basic political knowledge do a better job of absorbing available information and then 
using that information to cast party-line votes.  Furthermore, politically aware voters might use 
their existing ideology and/or their commitment to political issues as frameworks with which to 
analyze election information, so that the beliefs that they hold might serve as reinforcing factors 
by helping them retain information relevant to candidates’ partisan identification.   
 In Ohio judicial elections, where parties are not listed on the ballots, increases in the 
information available on a given contest provide a way to fill in the gap in voter knowledge, by 
providing the party identification which serves as an easy cue in partisan races.  This could be 
viewed in different ways depending on how one feels about partisanship in relation to judicial 
elections.  If one regards party identification as an accurate signal to voters in low-information 
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races about a candidate’s position, then this finding should suggest that more information ought 
to be available in Ohio judicial races—or perhaps even that Ohio ought to adopt a wholly 
partisan system, thereby lowering the information costs for voters seeking party identification for 
judicial candidates.  However, if one regards partisanship as inappropriate in judicial elections, 
then the results of this study might be of concern: voters use more information to make up for the 
nonpartisan nature of the ballots, rather than abandoning partisanship and voting based on other 
criteria.  However, research to date has not shown that voters in nonpartisan races substitute 
other meaningful cues in the absence of party identification.  Instead, studies on nonpartisan 
judicial elections have shown that the absence of party identification often has a negative effect 
on voter participation: Dubois (1980) writes, for instance, that “voters in states with the 
nonpartisan general election ballot must rely primarily upon nonparty cues for voting.  Often 
bewildered and confused, some voters are unable to reach a decision and simply refrain from 
voting” (93).  
 While the study provides no direct insight into voters’ attitudes towards judicial elections, 
the findings clearly do not suggest that voters are apathetic towards judicial races.  The fact that 
voters pick up on party cues when more information is available suggests that voters do seek out 
materials which will help them make more informed decisions.  This implication is in line with 
Dubois’ conclusion in From Ballot to Bench (1980) that, contrary to critics’ assertions that low 
voter turnout can be attributed to lack of interest, “judicial election turnout is very much 
determined by the same host of factors which affect turnout in other kinds of elections” (p. 244).  
Just as in other low-visibility races, judicial elections can pose a challenge to voters seeking 
meaningful information about the candidates; party identification serves as simple shorthand for 
30 
 
uninformed voters in partisan races.  In Ohio judicial elections, however, that cue is made more 
difficult to ascertain by the “mixed” election system. 
 Ultimately, the issue of judicial elections encompasses not only whether a nonpartisan or 
partisan system is preferable, but also whether judges should be selected through popular 
elections at all.  At least two major arguments against judicial elections can be made.  First, some 
scholars and politicians have argued that judges should be impervious to popular opinion, and 
that their objectivity in interpreting law ought not to be tainted by the need to appeal to the 
public.  According to this reasoning, judges who are elected might need to alter their opinions or 
the decisions they would otherwise make in order to be elected or re-elected.  A second argument 
against judicial elections is that even if judges should be held accountable to the public, ordinary 
citizens are ignorant about and apathetic to judicial elections.  By this logic, the uninformed 
electorate is not capable of intelligently selecting state judges, and so decisions should be left up 
to those who know better, such as the governor or a panel of lawyers. 
 However, the fact remains that there is popular support for judicial elections, which 
indicates that voters do care about how judges are selected.  The present study adds further 
evidence to the argument that in fact, judicial elections are much like other low-information 
races, in that voters must deal with a paucity of available cues to help them decide.  In Ohio, the 
difficulty of that choice is compounded by the fact that parties are not listed on the ballot: voters 
are deprived of what might be the only cheap informational cue they would have in similarly 
low-visibility partisan races.  However, the analyses of the effects of media coverage and 
spending indicate that voters do absorb the information that is available to them, since there are 
positive correlations between party voting rates and spending and media coverage levels.  If 
party identification is accepted as a meaningful, useful cue in judicial races, then these findings 
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are good news for proponents of judicial elections.  It appears that voters are not willfully 
ignorant, and that higher-visibility judicial elections—characterized by higher spending by the 
candidates and greater amounts of media coverage—might actually do a better job than low-
visibility races of helping voters make more informed decisions.   
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